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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine novel data on the detailed investment decisions of professional value 
investors. We find evidence that value investors are not easily defined: they exploit 
traditional tangible asset valuation discrepancies such as buying high book-to-market 
stocks, but spend more time analyzing intrinsic value, growth measures, and special 
situation investments. We also test whether fundamental value investors outperform the 
market in our sample (January 2000 to June 2008). Analyzing buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns and calendar-time portfolio regressions, we conclude that value investors have 
stock picking skills. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G10, G11, G14 
 
Key words: Value investing, abnormal returns, hedge funds, market efficiency, 
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This paper adds to the research on the issue of market efficiency. Instead of 
developing a quantitative trading rule that may or may not be implementable in the 
real world, or examining the returns of a broad cross-section of money managers who 
presumably have no skill on average, we analyze 2912 individual investment decisions of 
professional fundamental value investors, whose job is to discover inefficiently priced 
assets and determine if the costs of pursuing them (noise-trader risk, liquidity risk, 
distress risk, macro risks, trading costs, and so forth) are worth the benefits. We answer 
a simple question: do professional value investors have stock picking skills? 
We present evidence that suggests value investors have stock picking skills on 
both the long and short side. Using buy-and-hold-return (BHAR) analysis, we find that 
abnormal returns for long positions are economically and statistically significant for one-
year holding periods. Short positions generate even stronger abnormal returns over one-, 
two-, and three-year horizons. Calendar-time portfolio regressions show similar results. 
Alphas across various models and time periods are economically large and, for the most 
part, statistically significant.   
We address another important question in this paper: how do real world value 
investors make investment decisions? The common assumption in academic work is that 
value investors are those who focus on high book-to-market stocks (e.g. Piotroski 
(2000)).  And yet, Martin and Puthenpurackal (2008) show that Warren Buffett, widely 
known as the greatest value investor of all time, is a “growth” investor according to the 
Fama and French size and book-to-market classification scheme.   
Real world value investors presumably drive asset prices to fundamental values 
(in contrast to technical traders or index investors). Studying the fundamental 
investor’s thought process can help researchers understand why and how assets are 
priced empirically. Are these investors examining the correlation of their consumption 
habits with past return data to make their decision? Are they calculating CAPM, 
Fama-French, or momentum factor weightings? Or are they focused on identifiable 
processes such as business fundamentals, management signals, and the competitive 
landscape? 
We find that, in our sample, value investors overwhelmingly focus on measures of 
intrinsic value: they examine valuation models based on discounted free cash flows, use 
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various earnings multiple measures, and often search for growth-at-a-reasonable-price 
(GARP) investments. These same investors spend much less time analyzing book to 
market or other tangible asset undervaluation measures. To a lesser extent, these 
investors favor the analysis of open market repurchases, net operating losses, spin-offs, 
turnarounds, and activist involvement. None of the investment thesis we analyze make 
use of statistical models of asset pricing in the academic literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the related 
literature. Section II describes the data. Section III provides the main results on the 
characterization of value investor decisions. Section IV tests for skill amongst real world 
value investors. Section V discusses the results, and Section VI concludes.  
 
I. Related Literature 
Researchers have studied the performance of professional money managers 
extensively.  There is an ongoing debate addressing whether or not practitioners have 
stock picking skills. In general, such work has supported the efficient market hypothesis, 
but the results are mixed. 
Specifically, studies of mutual fund managers have found that mutual funds, on 
average, do not outperform their benchmarks (Carhart (1997), Malkiel (1995), Daniel et 
al. (1997)). However, other papers have found that there is predictive content in mutual 
funds’ past excess returns for future excess returns (Carlson (1970), Lehman and Modest 
(1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendricks et al. (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson 
(1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Elton et al. (1996), Carhart (1997)). This finding 
suggests that although a broad cross-section of mutual fund managers fails to 
outperform, certain managers may have stock picking skill (Baks et al. (2001)). Using 
new statistical techniques, Kosowski et al. (2006) add to the debate and present 
evidence that some money managers can cover their costs and maintain persistent 
alphas. 
Studies of individual money managers provide more evidence for market 
efficiency.  Desai and Jain (1995) examine the performance of recommendations made 
by “superstar” money managers and find little evidence of superior stock picking skill.  
Barber et al. (2001) confirm this result and find that excess returns to the 
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recommendations of stock analysts are not reliably positive. 
Professional investors (value investors tend to be the most outspoken) 
understandably resist the implication that, as a group, they are destined to fail in their 
attempts to outperform the market. This has led to harsh criticism of the efficient 
market hypothesis and sometimes a rebuke of academic finance generally.  Charles 
Munger, the co-chairman of Berkshire Hathaway and lifelong partner of Warren Buffett, 
sumed up a familiar sentiment in a 2003 lecture at the University of California at Santa 
Barbara: 
 
“First, he [the academic] said Berkshire beat the market in common stock 
investing through one sigma of luck, because nobody could beat the market 
except by luck. This hard-form version of efficient market theory was taught in 
most schools of economics at the time. People were taught that nobody could 
beat the market. Next the professor went to two sigmas, and three sigmas, and 
four sigmas, and when he finally got to six sigmas of luck, people were laughing 
so hard he stopped doing it” (Munger (2003)). 
 
  Academics have attempted to address the concerns of Mr. Munger and the rest 
of the professional value investor community. Numerous studies have examined the 
performance of quantitative measures meant to capture the techniques used by 
practitioners–the evidence for anomalous market behavior is persuasive. For instance, 
Basu’s (1977) study on Price-Earnings ratios, Banz’ (1981) work on the size effect, 
Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein’s (1985) discovery of the book-to-
market effect, and Fama and French’s (1992) analysis of the intersection between size 
and value all imply the existence of empirically tested market-beating strategies. Other 
authors have analyzed more focused value strategies. Examples include the accrual 
anomaly (Sloan (1996)), balance sheet screens (Piotroski (2000) and Mohanram (2005)), 
open market repurchase strategies (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995)), and 
insider trading rules (Seyhun (1988)). 
One problem with emulating value strategies through simple quantitative trading 
rules is that these emulation strategies can never fully incorporate the realities of the 
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marketplace. The limits to arbitrage and behavioral finance literature (see Barberis and 
Thaler (2003) for a survey of the literature) have highlighted some of the issues real-
world investors must face. The work of these researchers suggests that human 
psychology (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), institutional constraints (Shleifer and 
Vishney (1997)), and implementation costs (Pontiff (1996), Ackert and Tian (1998), and 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)) keep market prices from reflecting proper values 
because they directly affect the professional investor’s ability to profit.  
Fama (1998) analyzes the various trading anomalies as a group. He shows that 
the anomalous results from the behavioral finance literature are conflicting in many 
cases and that the results can depend on the methodology employed. His conclusion is 
that market efficiency holds; our results suggest otherwise. 
  
II. Data 
A. Value Investors Club 
 The data in this study are collected from a private internet community called 
Valueinvestorsclub.com (VIC), proclaimed by the founders to be an “exclusive online 
investment club where top investors share their best ideas.”1 The site has been heralded 
in many business publications as a top-notch resource for anyone who can attain 
membership (Financial Times, Barron’s, Business Week, and Forbes among others). The 
site was founded by Joel Greenblatt and John Petry, both successful value investors and 
managers of the large hedge fund Gotham Capital.  It was created with $400,000 of 
start-up capital to be the site with “the best-quality ideas on the Web” (Barker (2001)). 
The investment ideas submitted on the club’s site are broad, but are best described as 
fundamental value plays. The VIC site mentions that it is open to any well thought-out 
investment recommendation, but has a particular focus on equity or bond-based plays 
(either long or short), traditional asset undervaluation plays (high B/M, low P/E, 
liquidations, etc.), and investment ideas based on the notion of value as articulated by 
Warren Buffett (firms selling at a discount to their intrinsic value irrespective of 
common valuation ratios). 
                                                 
1 http://www.valueinvestorsclub.com/Value2/Guests/Info.aspx 
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Membership in the club is capped at 250 and admittance to the club is based on 
an initial investment idea write up. If the quality of the research is satisfactory and the 
aspiring member is deemed a credible value investor and contributor to the club, he is 
admitted. Once admitted, members are required to submit two ideas per year with a 
maximum of six ideas a year (to ensure only their best ideas are submitted). Members 
can share comments with each other and rank each other’s ideas on a scale of 1 (bad) to 
10 (good). In addition, there is a weekly $5,000 prize awarded to the best idea 
submitted. Membership is continually monitored and those who fail to keep up with 
standards are thrown out.  
 The membership of VIC is highly confidential both to the public and within the 
club itself and all members post under aliases unrelated to their true identity. We have 
analyzed all of the VIC idea submissions since the club’s founding (January 1, 2000) and 
have reconciled the information in the recommendations with contemporaneously filed 
13-Ds, 13-Gs, and public statements to conclude that the membership of VIC primarily 
consists of value hedge fund managers, activist investors, and their associates. In 
addition, the authors have spoken to multiple professional investors and hedge fund 
managers to ascertain that VIC membership is exclusive and coveted by those in the 
industry. Our working assumption is that the investment ideas submitted to VIC are 
representative of professional value investors.  
 
B. Data Description 
 We analyze all investment reports submitted to VIC since the club’s founding on 
January 1, 2000 through June 30, 2008. In total we examine 2912 investment 
submissions. Reports length can range from a few hundred a few thousand words (see 
appendix for an example write-up). Investment ideas are wide ranging in respect to the 
asset traded, where the assets trade, and the complexity of the strategy employed. 
 For each investment report analyzed, we record various data: date and time of 
submission, symbol, price (at time of recommendation), market(s) traded, security(s) 
traded, strategy recommended (long, short, or long/short) and the “reasons for 
investing.” All data collected are unambiguous except for the reasons for investing. We 
compile a list of sixteen criteria that are frequently cited in VIC submissions as a reason 
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for investing.  Criteria were judged to be sufficiently common if at least 10 investment 
submissions acknowledged the use of the category. The sixteen categories are as follows: 
lack of sell-side analyst coverage, tangible asset undervaluation (high book-to-market, 
hidden real estate assets, etc.), insider buying/selling, intrinsic value undervaluation 
(discounted cash flow analysis, low P/E, EBIT/TEV, P/Sales, industry undervaluation, 
hidden growth opportunities, and so forth), complicated business or taxes creating 
investor confusion, “sum-of-parts” discount, liquidation potential, active share 
repurchase programs, recent restructuring or spinoff situation, misunderstood net 
operating loss tax assets, merger arbitrage (Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)), stub arbitrage 
(Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002)), activist involvement (Boyson and Mooradian 
(2007)), merger arbitrage trading opportunity, turnaround and/or bankruptcy 
emergence, and pair trade arbitrage (Froot and Dabora (1999)).  
With the sixteen categories established we analyze every idea and assign it to the 
appropriate categories. For example, the VIC submission cited in the appendix received 
four category labels: tangible asset undervaluation, insider buying, intrinsic value 
undervaluation, and net operating loss tax assets. By assigning investment submissions 
discrete criteria, we capture the essence of the why VIC members make their 
recommendations. 
Next we gather fundamental data about the recommended securities to determine 
the nature of the securities on which value investors focus.  These include SIC sector 
classification, book values, market value of equity, profitability measures, and price 
ratios (see Table 4). 
 Finally, we match the firms associated with a VIC recommendation to accounting 
and stock return data from CRSP/COMPUSTAT.  For the purposes of this study, we 
only analyze traditional long and short investment recommendations and set aside all 
ideas that would be considered special situations (liquidations, pairs arbitrage, stub 
arbitrage, and merger arbitrages), long/short recommendations, non-equity plays, and 
foreign-traded/ADR recommendations. We believe that while the non-traditional VIC 
submissions would be interesting to analyze, they are difficult to understand, require 
esoteric knowledge in many cases, and are hard to assess with statistical asset pricing 
tools.  Our final sample used to conduct long-term asset pricing tests includes 554 long 
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recommendations and 56 short recommendations between January 1, 2000 and 
December 31, 2005.  
 
III. Results: The Characteristics of Fundamental Value Investor Decisions 
Are value investors obsessed with book value? Do they dwell on E/P ratios? Do 
they incorporate open market repurchases, insider buying patterns, post earnings 
announcement drift, accruals, or other documented alpha producing strategies found in 
the academic literature? In this section we examine how fundamental value investors 
actually make investment decisions. 
Using the full sample of recommendations (n=2912), we find that value investors 
focus on US based common stock investments (84% of total recommendations), but find 
value in other markets as well:  13% of the recommended investments are 
internationally traded and 4% are non-equity investments. We also find that long 
recommendations in common stock represent the bulk of ideas submitted (87%) (see 
Table 1, Panel B).  
In Table 2 we present a summary of the criteria cited by VIC members as the 
basis for their recommendations. 2  We find that investors are overwhelmingly concerned 
with assessing intrinsic value.  Discounted cash flow models, earnings multiples, GARP, 
and other similar valuation techniques are overwhelmingly used (87.50% include this 
analysis in their recommendation). Based on these results, professional value investors 
tend to be Warren Buffett-style growth investors; however, approximately 24% of value 
investors do incorporate the classic value technique of focusing on tangible asset 
undervaluation.  The other favorite tools of value investors are open market repurchases 
(12.12%), the presence of net operating loss assets (5.29%), restructuring and spin-off 
situations (5.12%), and insider trading activity (4.70%). 
VIC members sometimes cite more than one criteria in an investment analysis.  
Table 3, Panel A describes the frequency of various permutations of criteria cited.  
Panel A shows that although value investors are highly focused on intrinsic value, many 
cite additional criteria, indicating not all investors are one-dimensional. Some of the 
                                                 
2 We analyze the full sample in this section, however, the characteristics of the sub-sample (n=610 (554 
(longs)+56(short)) we use for the asset pricing tests are very similar. 
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most common criteria combinations paired intrinsic undervaluation with signaling 
factors such as share repurchase programs, insider buying, and activist involvement.  
A surprising result from our analysis is the number of investors who referenced net 
operating loss assets as part of their investment thesis. We posit that net operating 
losses are typically complicated and associated with companies that have recently 
performed poorly and are hated by Wall Street. These two factors likely lead to 
attractive investment opportunities for professional investors that are unrecognized by 
the broader investment community. 
Value investors use a wide range of tools in their investment decisions, however, it 
is surprising how few criteria value investors use in their analysis. Panel B of Table 3 
shows that value investors typically employ up to three different criteria when making 
investment decisions. Ninety-eight percent of the recommendations cite three or fewer 
investment criteria, whereas only 2% cite four or more. We conjecture that limited 
resources and attention (Kahneman and Tversky (1973)), asset specific issues, 
overconfidence in one’s investment approach, and skepticism of academic anomalies are 
the primary reasons why professional value investors focus on very few criteria when 
making investment decisions. 
In Table 4 we present descriptive statistics of the securities recommended 
segregated by type of recommendation (long versus short).  In Panel A we tabulate the 
sector classification.  The recommendations are weighted heavily towards the 
manufacturing firms, representing 35.9% (40.7%) of the total of long (short) 
recommendations. Other sectors of focus for value investors are on services and financial 
services: services represent 16.4% (20.4%) and financial services comprise 14.8% (22.2%) 
of the long (short) recommendations. We conjecture that manufacturing firms are 
attractive to value investors because these firm’s businesses are easier to understand and 
evaluate.  
Panels C and D of Table 4 present a summary of the financial data pertaining to 
the recommended securities.  Long investment recommendations are concentrated in 
small companies (with a slight tilt towards value) and short investment 
recommendations are concentrated in small-growth companies. The median market 
capitalization is $379 million ($510 million) for long (short) recommendations. The 
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median book-to-market ratio among long recommendations is 0.63, which suggests a 
slight tilt towards value based on average B/M breakpoints from 2000 to 2008.  
However, among short recommendations the median is much lower, 0.32, suggesting 
that when betting against a firm, value investor focus on securities that would be 
considered overvalued on a book-to-market basis. With respect to profitability, long 
recommended firms are generally more profitable than the firms that are short 
recommendations.  Median return on assets is 5% for long recommendations and 4% for 
short recommendations.  
 
IV. Results: Analysis of Value Investor Performance 
In this section we examine the performance of the recommendations made by value 
investors.   We calculate abnormal returns in both event time and calendar time 
because of the considerable debate in the literature about the preferable technique for 
determining long-run abnormal performance. We perform our calculations over horizons 
of one-, two- and three-years because these are the time horizons most commonly 
referenced in the VIC community member recommendations.  As Barber and Lyon 
(1997) argue, traditional event-time buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) “precisely 
measure investor experience” of buy-and-hold investors, the contingent most common in 
the value investing community.  However, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) find that this 
method fails to account for cross-sectional dependence among firm abnormal returns in 
event time.  As such, we choose to present results under both methodologies.   
Our event-time BHAR methodology follows that of Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) 
and we account for event-time skewness bias by using the bootstrapping method they 
suggest when calculating t-statistics. We calculate abnormal returns as 
ARit = Rit — E(Rit), 
where ARit is the BHAR to firm i in period t, Rit is the return generated by 
compounding successive monthly returns to firm i over period t and E(Rit) is the 
compounded benchmark return in the same period.  The benchmark returns are 
generated in a two-step procedure from either the single-factor market model, Fama-
French three-factor model, and the four-factor model (Carhart (1997)).  The model 
parameters are estimated using data from the period of 60 months ending twelve 
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months before the recommendation is posted to the community.   
We calculate the one-, two- and three-year BHARs to each recommendation using 
monthly CRSP data, following the advice of Brown and Warner (1985) who espouse the 
benefits of using monthly data rather than daily data. The event period return data 
begin on the first of the month following the date the recommendation was posted to 
the community.   
Table 5 presents raw buy-and-hold returns to long and short recommendations and 
BHARs using benchmarks calculated with the CRSP Value-Weighted Index.  As shown 
in Panel A, fundamental value investors appear to have stock picking ability over one-
year time horizons for long recommendations.  Raw one-year returns are large–more 
than 33% per year.  Further, the market model-adjusted returns are also large, at 
19.14%, and statistically significant at the 1% level.  One-year BHARs calculated with 
the three-factor and four-factor benchmark are not as large–10.12% and 9.39%, 
respectively–but still impressive and statistically significant. 
For horizons beyond one year, stock picking ability declines.  After accounting for 
various combinations of factor returns, two-year BHARs for long recommendations are 
not significantly different from zero. At three-year horizons, BHAR returns are actually 
negative and statistically significant for the three- and four-factor models. This data 
seems to suggest that value investors identify undervalued assets in the current period 
that the broader market later identifies throughout the year. 
Table 5, Panel B shows the performance of short sale recommendations.  Raw 
returns to short selling recommendations are negative over all time horizons, which is 
expected if the general market has an upward drift. However, after controlling for risk, 
evidence suggests that value investors are successful short sellers. Abnormal returns for 
all benchmark models and all holding periods are positive, economically large, and 
statistically significant. These results are similar to recent findings from Boehmer, Jones, 
and Zhang (2008), who analyze short sales using proprietary NYSE order data. 
We also find abnormal returns using the calendar-time portfolio approach 
advocated by Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Fama (1998).  First, we create event 
portfolios consisting of all firms recommended in month t.  We then calculate the 
monthly returns to the portfolio in excess of the risk free rate and then regress this 
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variable on the excess value-weighted market index return as well as the SMB (small 
minus big), HML (high book-to-market minus low book-to-market) and MOM (high 
momentum minus low momentum) pricing factors.3  We perform this procedure for 
portfolios constructed on both a value-weighted and an equal-weighted basis. 
The results of the calendar-time portfolio regressions are presented in Table 6.  
Whereas BHAR analysis shows strong evidence for the hypothesis that value investor 
have stock picking skills, the calendar-time portfolio regression provides favorable, but 
less convincing results.  In Panel A we present the alphas of regressions of long 
recommendation portfolios.  These estimates represent the mean monthly abnormal 
return over the calendar time horizon.  Alphas for the three- and four-factor models all 
have economically significant positive point estimates for the one-, two-, and three-year 
calendar-time portfolio regressions,  however, their significance is mixed.   
Significance of alphas estimated by portfolio regressions depends on whether a 
value- or equal-weighted portfolio is used.  Equal-weighted portfolio regressions produce 
much more significant (both economically and statistically) alphas.  Because the equal-
weighted portfolios weight small firms more heavily by construction, we interpret the 
result as a small-firm effect.  Further, because informational asymmetries are greater 
among small firms, there should be more reward to investors’ research efforts in small 
firms. We interpret this result as evidence that value investors are more successful at 
identifying undervalued stocks among small firms than they are in the large cap 
universe.  
Panel B presents the results to portfolios formed from short recommendations.  
These results are consistent with the BHAR analysis.  Mean monthly abnormal returns 
are large and statistically significant in all instances, but decrease monotonically as the 
calendar time horizon is increased. 
To further investigate the hypothesis that alpha-generation by value investors is 
the result of a small-firm effect, we segregate our sample of long recommendations by 
market value of equity and repeat the calendar-time approach.  First we calculate 
market value of equity on the day the recommendation was made and assign each 
                                                 
3 Factors obtained from Ken French’s website 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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observation to one of five quintiles, where quintile 1 represents the smallest firms and 
quintile 5 represents the largest.  We then calculate calendar-time portfolio regression 
alphas over the same one-, two- and three-year time horizons used above, using the 
three- and four-factor asset pricing models used above. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 7.  Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find much larger and more statistically significant alphas in our small 
firm quintile.  Alphas across all models, portfolio weightings, and time horizons are 
statistically significant in quintile 1, but very small and generally insignificant in 
quintile 5.   
Overall, the results of these calendar time portfolio regressions corroborate the 
BHAR analysis and provide further evidence for value investor stock picking skill.4 
 
V. Discussion 
An underlying assumption of our analysis is that value managers would submit 
“actionable” investment recommendations to Valueinvestorsclub.com. This raises the 
basic question of why investors share information about a great investment opportunity.  
According to efficient market logic (Fama (1970)), the rational arbitrager should act 
alone, drive the price to the fundamental level, and reap all the rewards of the arbitrage 
he has found. Unfortunately, arbitragers find this difficult in practice. Two primary 
reasons for this are capital constraints and the limits to arbitrage arising from the 
realities in the investment management business (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Stein 
(2007) also questions why one would tell another honestly about an attractive 
investment opportunity when money managers care about relative performance. Stein’s 
question is valid, however we agree with prior researchers (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) 
who suggest that a lack of transparency and understanding of what “relative 
performance” actually means, cause investors to simply focus on past returns. 
Dow and Gorton’s (1994) analysis of arbitrager behavior suggests that arbitragers 
will only make investments if they believe subsequent arbitrager demand will push the 
asset price to fundamental value. One way arbitragers can help ensure other arbitragers 
                                                 
4 We analyze the sample matched with the BHAR sample for ease of comparison.  We have conducted calendar time 
portfolio analysis using a larger sample of firms (we include firms that were dropped in the BHAR sample due to an 
inability to find model estimates using 60 months of data) and the results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.   
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take a position in an asset is by sharing their ideas with others.  Practitioners refer to 
this as “talking up your own book.” We believe this is one reason investors may share 
ideas on Valueinvestorsclub.com.   
However, after examining all investment theses and the subsequent commentary, 
we believe members submit many ideas to Valueinvestorsclub.com in which they are 
still accumulating shares or have yet to take a position. Gray (2008) provides a 
framework for this no-strings-attached sharing behavior in an investment world where 
there are limited research resources and money managers must deal with investors who 
are prone to pulling their funds when a fund manager posts a negative return. He finds 
that fund managers will desire to share ideas with other fund managers so they can 
diversify their portfolios amongst a group of good ideas, as opposed to holding 
concentrated positions in their own good ideas. 
Quantitatively determining the specific motivations behind the drive for members 
of Valueinvestorsclub.com to post investment ideas is intrinsically difficult; however, our 
extensive analysis of investment recommendations allows us to make qualitative 
assessments. We believe a few managers use the site to talk up their own book and may 
only post ideas once they have taken a full position. One value investor who 
recommended purchasing Aavid Thermal Technologies 12.75% senior subordinate noted 
on December 31, 2002, that, “Self-interest precluded me from posting the idea [earlier] 
because the bonds are fairly illiquid and it takes a few months to build a position.” 
Nevertheless, it seems that the majority of the VIC members are genuinely 
interested in adding value to the community by posting actionable investment 
recommendations and frequently state that they are actively buying (or selling in the 
case of short sale ideas) in the market. Our asset pricing results lend indirect evidence 
that members are not using the site purely as a marketing tool. If this were the case, we 
would not expect to find the economically large and statistically significant long-term 
abnormal returns we find in our database. Plus, if arbitragers (or value hedge fund 
managers in this case) are capital constrained as a group they will not have the 
capability to drive prices to fundamental value in the short run and must eventually 
rely on a broader flow of capital from the markets in order for their investment to 
realize it’s return (Gray (2008)). In this capital constrained world, as long as VIC keeps 
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its membership limited and exclusive, there should be ample opportunity for the 
community to take positions at undervalued prices before the broader market discovers 
the undervaluation. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper addresses two economic questions: how do value investors make 
investment decisions, and do they have stock picking skills? We find that value 
investors are not focused on high book-to-value stocks, but instead focus on intrinsic 
value (discounted value of after-tax free cash flows generated by a business)  and 
signaling factors in the market (e.g. open market repurchases, insider buying, activist 
activity). These investors also tend to favor smaller stocks with a value bias for long 
positions and small growth stocks for short positions. We also determine that value 
investors are fairly one dimensional and utilize only a few tools when making their 
investment decisions. This suggests that professional investors may suffer from limited 
attention and resource deficiency. 
Our analysis of value investors’ investments suggests that value investors do have 
stock picking skills. Utilizing the BHAR and the calendar-time portfolio regression 
approaches, we find evidence that value investors reliably outperform the market. This 
result is not surprising. The recommendations we analyze are well researched, and 
required numerous costly resources to create. In equilibrium, value investors should be 
compensated for their efforts in analyzing businesses and driving assets to fundamental 
value (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). 
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Appendix 
The following idea to go long Sunterra Corporation was submitted on 6/22/2004 
by the VIC user “ruby831” and received a club average rating of 5.8–a good idea 
according to the community, but not stellar. The write-up is roughly representative of 
the average idea submission by VIC members. 
Submission begins:  
Sunterra Corporation (SNRR), a post-reorg equity, is the largest independent  
vacation ownership company in the world, with more than 300,000 owner families 
vacationing at 94 resorts in 12 countries in North America, Europe and the Caribbean. 
Originally founded as Signature Resorts, prior management built the company through 
multiple acquisitions that were never integrated.  As a result, poor operations and 
controls, combined with an overly leveraged balance sheet, forced the company to file 
for bankruptcy in 2000.  During Chapter 11, a new management team was assembled, 
with the CEO slot filled by the chief of its successful European operations.  Although 
Sunterra emerged as a public company from bankruptcy in 2002, the company required 
a continued turnaround in operations, including unifying its systems, re-building its 
sales force, improving its credit processes and opening a new headquarters. 
By the third quarter of 2003, the evidence of a turnaround clearly emerged, as operating 
margins improved substantially from 3% in Q3 2002 to 16% in Q3 2003.  Also 
significant by late 2003, money losing US operations, which had been depressing overall 
results, turned profitable for the first time in years. Following the release of 2003 
results, management provided guidance for 2004 that projected sales growth of 
approximately 17%, but due to the full year impact of improved operations, margins 
and refinancings, an almost doubling of net income (fully taxed and excluding non-cash, 
reorg related expenses) from approximately $0.52/share to $0.97/share.   
In addition to the positive trends specific to Sunterra, the company also benefits 
from positive industry fundamentals.  The vacation ownership industry has shown 
consistent annual growth, even during recessions and the aftermath of terrorist attacks.  
Also significant, the industry has evolved into a more professionally managed and 
institutionally driven market.  In addition to Sunterra, industry leaders include major 
lodging and leisure companies, such as Cendant, Starwood, Marriot, Hilton and Disney, 
among others.  The vacation ownership industry should continue to enjoy strong 
fundamentals, with a market penetration rate of about 7% domestically and less than 
3% in Europe, coupled with the positive demographics of aging baby boomers.   
Furthering Sunterra’s momentum will be the nationwide availability by the third 
quarter of a global “points-based” marketing and sales format.  Currently in the U.S., 
customers purchase vacation ownership units through a deeded interest in a property for 
a certain number of weeks of usage per year at specific resorts.  By selling on a global 
points based system, in which customers purchase points rather than weeks, Sunterra 
will significantly enhance its value proposition and its marketing capability to the 
existing customer base (the best source of new sales) and decrease marketing expenses.  
(The European unit has operated under a points system for many years and has 
historically shown marketing expenses as a percentage of sales lower than the U.S. by 
over 300bps.) 
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Other factors highlight Sunterra’s solid business characteristics.  These include a 
strong recurring revenue base (about 30% of revenues), including property management 
fee income (about $30mm); resort rental revenues ($11mm-$15mm); interest income on 
a $230mm+ receivables portfolio ($26mm+); and other income, including annual Club 
Sunterra, travel agency commissions and other fees ($20mm).  In addition, about 40% of 
the balance of revenues (comprised of the sale of VOIs, or “vacation ownership 
interests”), comes from existing customers.  Solid barriers to entry exist in the 
increasingly institutionalized vacation ownership industry, including the significant 
capital and scale required for multiple properties and global operations, as well as state 
regulatory hurdles in creating a global points- based system (SNRR labored for two+ 
years to implement it).  Smaller, regional players are finding it difficult to compete, 
providing opportunities for Sunterra to acquire inventory, portfolios and customers at 
attractive prices (two deals closed in the last five months).  Alternatively, since SNRR 
is the largest independent operator in the industry, it offers a compelling strategic asset 
to other lodging and leisure industry companies. 
On the acquisition front, SNRR recently announced the purchase of 100% of a 
premier Hawaii resort that it managed and in which it owned a 23% stake.  This 
property boosts an already impressive amount of resort inventory from about $600m at 
retail to $835mm at retail, representing almost 2.5 years of inventory.  While the 
company has stated (without specifics) that this acquisition will be accretive, we 
estimate that it will add about $0.04 per share annually on a fully taxed basis.  
Importantly, there is no integration risk, since SNRR already manages and sells this 
property as part of its vacation network. 
Based on a stock price of $12.40, a market capitalization of $248mm and net  
corporate debt of $135mm (excludes debt secured by the mortgage receivable portfolio), 
SNRR has an enterprise value of $383mm.  We estimate EBITDA (our definition of 
which, consistent with the view of strategic buyers, is after interest expense on debt 
secured by mortgage receivables) to be $55mm for 2004 and $74mm for 2005, implying 
multiples of 7.0 and 5.2x, respectively.  We estimate fully taxed EPS (excluding non-
cash charges related to the reorganization and certain non-cash interest amortization) of 
$0.99 for 2004 and $1.44 for 2005, implying P/E multiples of 12.5x and 8.6x.  A 
domestic NOL of $137.5mm, worth more than $1.00/share on a present value basis, 
makes these multiples even more attractive.   
Industry transaction multiples have ranged from 7-11x EBITDA; we believe that 
SNRR would garner a premium multiple, but even applying the low end of the range of 
7x 2005 EBITDA implies a $17.50 stock price (based on fully diluted shares included a 
recently issued convert, warrants and options and including corporate debt related to 
the Hawaii acquisition).  The high end multiple would suggest a $28 stock price.  Book 
value per share of about $10 ($7/share tangible book) also provides support for the 
stock.  In any case, the stock appears attractively valued with earnings expected to 
grow organically at 25%+ for the near future.   
Finally, we note that management has strong incentives to create shareholder 
value, with two million options struck at $15.25 per share.  Following the release of Q1 
earnings, management further proved its commitment and incentives, with the CEO and 
CFO both reporting purchases of the stock at approximately $11.00 per share.   
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Table 1: Investment Characteristics 
This table reports summary statistics for the sample of professional value investor investment 
recommendations. The sample includes all recommendations shared with the Valueinvestorsclub.com 
community from the time of the community’s launch on January 1, 2000 through June 30, 2008.  Panel A 
reports where assets are traded and the asset type recommended.  Panel B reports the number of each 
long, short and long/short recommendation by the type of asset. Panel C reports the number of each 
long, short, and long/short recommendation by trading location. 
 
Panel A: Asset type and trading location (n=2912)  
Market Common 
Stock 
Bonds Preferred 
Stock 
Convertible 
Securities 
Warrants Options Other Total
US 2442 37 24 4 7 7 25 2546 
Canada 138 1 2 0 0 0 2 143 
UK/Europe 121 2 0 0 0 0 1 124 
Japan 14 0 0 0 0 0 1 15 
Hong Kong 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
Korea 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
Other 57 0 0 0 0 0 1 58 
Total 2798 40 26 4 7 7 30 2912 
        
Panel B: Recommendation by asset type (n=2912)
 
Common 
Stock 
Bonds 
 
Preferred 
Stock 
Convertible 
Securities 
Warrants
 
Options Other Total
Long 2537 35 20 4 7 7 8 2618 
Short 230 0 3 0 0 0 5 238 
Long/Short 31 5 3 0 0 0 17 56 
Total 2798 40 26 4 7 7 30 2912 
       
Panel C: Recommendation and market location (n=2912)
 US Canada UK/ 
Europe 
Japan Hong
Kong 
Korea Other Total
Long 2271 140 116 14 11 12 54 2618 
Short 232 0 4 0 0 0 2 238 
Long/Short 43 3 4 1 2 1 2 56 
Total 2546 143 124 15 13 13 58 2912 
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Table 2: Frequency of Criteria Cited as Basis for Recommendations 
 
This table summarizes how frequently Valueinvestorsclub.com members cited various reasons as the basis 
for their recommendations.  Each recommendation is assigned at least one reason, and many ideas receive 
multiple reasons. Criteria were included if there were at least 10 recommendations that cited it as a 
unique criteria for investing in a particular asset.  
 
N=2912  
Criteria description % of total
Intrinsic Value Undervaluation 87.50 
Tangible Asset Undervaluation 23.56 
Active Open-Market Share Repurchase Program 12.12 
Net Operating Loss Assets 5.29 
Recent Restructuring, Spinoff or Spinoff Potential 5.12 
Undervaluation on a “Sum-of-the-Parts” Basis 4.84 
Insider Buying 4.70 
Involvement of Activist Investor 4.29 
Lack of Sell-Side Analyst Coverage 2.75 
Turnaround and/or Recent Bankruptcy 2.40 
Liquidation Potential 2.30 
Complicated Business or Taxes Creating Investor Confusion 2.06 
Merger Arbitrage Situation 1.44 
“Stub” Arbitrage Situation 1.37 
Merger Arbitrage Trading Opportunity 0.82 
Pair-trade Strategy 0.69 
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Table 3: How Value Investors Make Decisions 
 
This table shows summary statistics for the sample of investment recommendations submitted to Valueinvestorsclub.com between January 1, 2000 
and June 30, 2008. Panel A highlights the top combinations of investment criteria used by value investors. Panel B reports the number of 
investment criteria used by investor recommendations submitted to Valueinvestorsclub.com. (n=2912). 
 
Panel A: Most common combinations  Panel B: # of criteria used 
Rank Criteria combination # criteria % of total    # % of total  
1 Intrinsic value 1378 45.57  1 1568 53.85  
2 Tangible assets; intrinsic value 278 9.55  2 973 33.41  
3 Intrinsic value; share repurchase program 181 6.22  3 308 10.58  
4 Tangible assets 117 4.02  4 57 1.96  
5 Intrinsic value; net operating loss assets 64 2.20  5+ 6 .21  
6 Intrinsic value; restructuring, spinoff, or spinoff potential 62 2.13      
7 Intrinsic value; insider buying 60 2.06      
8 Tangible assets; intrinsic value; share repurchase program 58 1.99      
9 Intrinsic value; sum of parts 50 1.72       
10 Intrinsic value; activist investor involvement 37 1.27       
Others  571 23.28     
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics  
This table reports summary statistics for the sub sample of professional value investor investment recommendations that have the necessary data from 
CRSP/Compustat to perform asset pricing tests. Panel A and B examine the distribution of investment recommendations using four-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) industries. Panel C and D show the fundamental characteristics of investment ideas. B/M is the ratio of the LTM book value of equity to the 
market value of equity measured at the end of the month in which the investment is recommended. E/M is the ratio of LTM trailing earnings to the market value 
of equity measured at the end of the month in which the investment is recommended. ROA is the LTM return on assets. ME is the market value of equity 
measured at the end of the month in which the investment is recommended. 
 
 Panel A: Industry representation for long 
recommendations (n=554) 
Panel B: Industry representation short 
recommendations (n=56) 
Industry SIC codes 
Number of 
recommendations 
Percent of 
sample 
 Number of 
recommendations 
Percent of 
sample 
Agriculture < 1,000 2 0.4 
 
2 3.7 
Mining 1,000-1,499 15 2.7 
 
0 0 
Construction 1,500-1,999 12 2.2  0 0 
Manufacturing 2,000-3,999 197 35.9  24 40.7 
Transportation 4,000-4,999 54 9.8 
 
2 3.7 
Wholesale trade 5,000-5,199 26 4.7  1 1.9 
Retail trade 5,200-5,999 74 13.4  4 7.4 
Financial Services 6,000-6,999 81 14.8  12 22.2 
Services 7,000-8,999 90 16.4  11 20.4 
Other > 9,000 3 0.6  0 0 
   
Total 
 
554
 
100.0%
 
 56
 
100.0%
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (continued)  
 Panel C: Long recommendation fundamental 
characteristics (n=554) 
Panel D: Short recommendation fundamental 
characteristics (n=56) 
Variable 
Mean 
25th
Percentile Median 
75th  
Percentile Mean 
25th
Percentile Median 
75th
Percentile
ME (millions) 2,994 94 379 1,441 1,115 219 510 1,268 
B/M 0.77 0.38 0.63 1.04 0.57 0.23 0.32 0.48 
E/M -0.08 0.01 0.06 0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.08 
ROA 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.11 
ROE 1.56 0.01 0.11 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.13 0.20 
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Table 5: One-, Two- and Three-year BHAR to Community Member Recommendations 
Using CRSP Value-Weighted Index 
 
Returns are calculated for all observations with sufficient return data. We require that all event period 
returns have no missing values and no missing values during the estimation period.  Raw returns are 
simple buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) calculated by compounding monthly returns over the event period.  
Market model BHAR are calculated with the single-factor market model as a benchmark.  Fama-French 
Three-Factor BHAR are calculated with the three-factor model as a benchmark. Four-factor BHAR uses 
benchmark returns generated by the Fama-French three-factors plus the Carhart (1997) momentum 
factor.   Bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Long Recommendations (n=554)
 Raw Return Market Model Three-Factor Four-Factor
One-year 33.46% 19.14% 10.12% 9.39% 
 (15.97)*** (7.16)*** (3.75)*** (3.39)*** 
     
Two-year 63.08% 20.86% 5.73% -3.65% 
 (21.97)*** (3.71)*** (1.03) (-0.61) 
     
Three-year 92.82% 3.23% -16.77% -41.23% 
 (24.81)*** (0.30) (-1.71)* (-3.90)** 
     
Panel B: Short Recommendations (n=56)
 Raw Return Market Model Three-Factor Four-Factor
One-year -7.22% 24.83% 29.96% 33.12% 
 (-1.05) (2.82)** (3.20)** (3.41)** 
     
Two-year -21.60% 38.75% 46.46% 51.10% 
 (-2.27)* (2.60)* (2.96)* (3.27)** 
     
Three-year -42.67% 42.10% 51.90% 57.63% 
 (-3.23)** (1.97) (2.34) (2.63)* 
     
*, ** and *** denote one-tailed statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively.
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Table 6: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions 
 
One-, two- and three-year calendar-time regressions using the model given by ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜൫ܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൯ ൅ ߜ௜ሺܵܯܤ௧ሻ ൅ ߛ௜ሺܪܯܮ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, or  
ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜൫ܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൯ ൅ ߜ௜ሺܵܯܤ௧ሻ ൅ ߛ௜ሺܪܯܮ௧ሻ ൅ ߠሺܯܱܯ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, where ܴ௣,௧ is the return in month t to a calendar-time portfolio of firms 
constructed from community member long recommendations.  ܴ௠,௧ is the return on the value-weighted market portfolio.  ௙ܴ,௧ is the one-month T-
bill rate. ܵܯܤ௧ is the difference in the returns of the portfolios of small stocks and big stocks. ܪܯܮ௧ is the difference in the returns of the portfolios 
of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks.  ܯܱܯ௧ is the difference in the return of the average of portfolios of small and big 
past winners and  the average of portfolios of  small and big past losers.  The factors used in the regressions are obtained from Ken French’s 
website. The sample used in these regressions consists of 554 long recommendations or 56 short recommendations. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics are in parentheses.   
 
 
                      Value-Weighted Portfolios         Equal-Weighted Portfolios
 One-year Two-year Three-year  One-year Two-year Three-year
Panel A: Long Recommendations   
   
Three-Factor model alpha 0.0072 0.0078 0.0067  0.0158 0.0124 0.0091
 (1.09) (1.54) (1.64)  (5.51)*** (3.18)*** (2.74)**  
         
Four-Factor model alpha 0.0069 0.0073 0.0076  0.0156 0.0120 0.0098  
 (1.09) (1.52) (1.93)*  (3.97)*** (3.52)*** (3.34)***  
         
Panel B: Short Recommendations   
   
Three-Factor model alpha -0.0308 -0.0280 -0.0171  -0.0173 -0.0126 -0.0086
 (-2.85)** (-3.00)** (-2.16)*  (-2.42)** (-2.14)* (-1.88)* 
   
Four-Factor model alpha -0.0309 -0.0279 -0.0172  -0.0179 -0.0127 -0.0093  
 (-2.90)** (-3.02)** (-2.24)*  (-2.59)** (-2.19)* (-2.18)*  
          
*, ** and *** denote one-tailed statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively.
Fundamental Value Investors: Characteristics and Performance — Page 29 
 
 
Table 7: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions by Market Value of Equity 
 
Observations were sorted into quintiles based on market value of equity (MVE) of the underlying firm at the time of recommendations.  Each 
quintile was then independently subjected to the calendar-time portfolio regression methodology.  Shown in this table are one-, two- and three-year 
calendar-time regressions using the model given by ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜൫ܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൯ ൅ ߜ௜ሺܵܯܤ௧ሻ ൅ ߛ௜ሺܪܯܮ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,(Panel A), or  ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅
ߚ௜൫ܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൯ ൅ ߜ௜ሺܵܯܤ௧ሻ ൅ ߛ௜ሺܪܯܮ௧ሻ ൅ ߠሺܯܱܯ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, (Panel B), where ܴ௣,௧ is the return in month t to a calendar-time portfolio of firms 
constructed from community member long recommendations.  ܴ௠,௧ is the return on the value-weighted market portfolio.  ௙ܴ,௧ is the one-month T-
bill rate. ܵܯܤ௧ is the difference in the returns of the portfolios of small stocks and big stocks. ܪܯܮ௧ is the difference in the returns of the portfolios 
of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks.  ܯܱܯ௧ is the difference in the return of the average of portfolios of small and big 
past winners and  the average of portfolios of  small and big past losers.  The factors used in the regressions are obtained from Ken French’s 
website. The sample used in these regressions consist of 554 long recommendations, with 110 or 111 recommendations in each quintile. Size quintile 
1 is the quintile of the smallest MVE firms and Size quintile 5 is the quintile of the largest. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in 
parentheses.   
 
Panel A: Three-Factor Model alphas 
                      Value-Weighted Portfolios         Equal-Weighted Portfolios
 One-year Two-year Three-year  One-year Two-year Three-year
Size Quintile   
   
1 0.0187 0.0126 0.0132  0.0239 0.0175 0.0157
 (2.35)** (2.03)* (2.60)**  (2.99)** (3.07)** (3.30)**
       
2 0.0102 0.006 0.0008  0.0111 0.0061 0.0007
 
 (1.47) (1.46) (0.24)  (1.74)* (1.65)* (0.20)  
        
3 0.0192 0.0166 0.0093  0.0174 0.0150 0.0080  
 (2.08)* (2.32)* (1.50)  (2.34)** (2.56)** (1.53)  
   
4 0.0058 0.0031 0.0000  0.0086 0.0045 0.0014  
 (0.92) (0.64) (0.00)  (1.53) (0.98) (0.28)  
 
  
 
5 0.0037 0.0050 0.0045  0.0046 0.0065 0.0055  
 (0.53) (0.98) (1.08)  (0.84) (1.49) (1.55)  
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Table 7: Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions by Market Value of Equity (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Four-Factor Model alphas 
                      Value-Weighted Portfolios        Equal-Weighted Portfolios
 One-year Two-year Three-year One-year Two-year Three-year
Size Quintile  
  
1 0.0185 0.0123 0.0138 0.0237 0.0172 0.0163
 (2.34)** (1.99)* (2.63)** (3.32)** (3.03)** (3.39)***
       
2 0.0102 0.0057 0.0009 0.0111 0.0060 0.0007  
 (1.46) (1.40) (0.27) (1.75)* (1.61) (0.22)  
  
3 0.0197 0.0166 0.0109 0.0178 0.0150 0.0094  
 (2.24)* (2.38)* (1.95)* (2.53)** (2.73)** (1.95)*  
  
4 0.0053 0.0024 0.0005 0.0081 0.0039 0.0018  
 (0.94) (0.60) (0.09) (1.61) (0.99) (0.38)  
 
  
5 0.0036 0.0048 0.0054 0.0045 0.0062 0.0067  
 (0.52) (0.93) (1.30) (0.92) (1.63) (2.25)*  
         
*, ** and *** denote one-tailed statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively. 
 
